3rd WPCT, 23-24 April, 1997, Washington, D.C.
Moderators: Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Hon. Tashi Wangdi, and Hon. Harald Ellefsen
Disscussants: Hon. Ela Gandhi, Hon. Ian Revell
Hon. Nancy Pelosi: The best leverage for Tibetans is on the multilateral basis. However strong leadership is necessary to make multilateral relations work effectively.
I would like to thank the Danish government for its leadership in Geneva earlier this month. You taught us a lesson. Where is the conscience of the world when it comes to Tibet? The conscience present at this conference is needed to radiate out to a much larger group of people.
It is my honor to welcome Hon. Ela Gandhi, the representative from South Africa. South Africa taught the world the importance of how good can prevail when multilateral approaches are taken. I would also like to welcome the Deputy Speaker of Parliament of New Zealand, Hon. Ian Revell.
If any of us members of Congress can be a resource to you, please call on us. I would like to pledge my support to the conference, individually and on behalf of the Congressional Working Group on China, which I chair.
Hon. Ela Gandhi: South Africa's experience shows how multilateral strategies can work. After banning of political organizations in South Africa in 1960, many activities fled into exile and took refuge abroad, creating antiapartheid groups in countries around the world. These groups were joined by members of civil society. In some countries we were supported by the government while in others we received no government recognition.
Often these groups demonstrated against their own governments. The functions of these antiapartheid groups were many. They raised funds in exile to assist South Africa. They provided technical assistance in gathering, producing and distributing information documents. They worked on a multilateral basis with other countries in organizing a variety of campaigns. They created awareness on the South African issues by starting support groups and sending letters and telegrams on particular issues to the government in South Africa. They organized urgent action campaigns and worked with governments on issuing sanctions and boycotts of products, cultural and sports groups.
While governments assisted, it was civil society which isolated South Africa, when people refused to buy products or did not attend events in which South Africa participated. It was civil society which assisted those who were arrested by sending massive numbers of letters, held candle light vigils and made effective use of the media.
However, the issues were always defined by South Africans, at home and in exile. Campaigns had always a limited objective which were eye catching, such as the arrest of one person, the removal of one specific law or the release of Mandela.
There were a number of reasons the South African government came to the negotiations table. The focusing of all countries on one issue at the same time brought great pressure on the government. The campaigns were so effective because they focused on civil society, made people all over the world understand the issues and well coordinated. Civil society will support a cause once people really understand the issue. The issue must therefore be articulated concretely and with heart appeal.
South Africa has used the methods of negotiation and coercive diplomacy. Alexander George in his book Forceful Persuasion discusses the concepts of coercive diplomacy, a strategy which he defines as follows: " 1. Efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and or to undo an action he has already embarked in; 2. Respond to an encroachment already undertaken; 3. The possibility of a more flexible diplomacy that can employ non-coercive persuation and accommodation as well as coercive threats; 4. Usage of limited force coordinated with appropriate negotiations; and 5. Signalling, bargaining and negotiating are important dimensions of coercive diplomacy."
He goes on to describe variants on such a coercive diplomacy strategy: "Policy-makers must decide 1. What to demand of the opponent; 2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demands; 3. Whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for non-compliance; and 4, whether to rely sole on the threat of punishment or also to secure acceptance of the demand." In other words a carrot and stick approach.
The strength of the Tibet struggle lies on the high moral ground of the struggle for human rights. In developing strategy, it is imperative that limited objectives are set. Target government and see what strategy will impact it. Remember the strength of civil society and the limitations of governments. Gandhiji wrote about the strengths of women which lies in the nature of their natural compassion. It may be helpful to appeal to the compassion of women in China.
In closing I would like to quote from Mahatma Gandhi's book on Satyagraha in South Africa: "A Satyagrahi bids good-bye to fear. He is therefore never afraid of trusting his opponent. Even if the opponent plays him false twenty times, the Satyagrahi is ready to trust him the twenty first time, for an implicit trust in human nature is the very essence of his creed."
Hon. Ian Revell: We should start at the point we wish to finish at, namely, get discussions started between the two parties. The importance lies in getting negotiations started, preferably in a neutral venue. New Zealand's Foreign Minister pressed the position, while meeting with China's Vice Foreign Minister, that meetings should be held between China and the Dalai Lama's representatives. The Chinese give mixed messages to foreign diplomats, stating on the one hand that it is ready to negotiate on everything except the independence of Tibet, and on the other hand refusing to start negotiations. It is therefore essential that pressure be kept up, by such methods as holding this conference in such a prominent venue as Washington D.C. Such pressure will necessitate Beijing to continue to expend a great amount of political capital in putting in fires.
Yesterday, we discussed that the breakup of the USSR is a precursor, many of us feel, of what will happen in China. The breakup in China is almost certain. China fears that starting talks with Tibet will cause other groups to seek such talks. The leadership, mostly elderly and wealthy, looks just at today and tomorrow, wanting to assure the continued wealth of their personal offspring.
The conference should work on model resolutions so that the same message goes to Beijing hundred fold. Parliaments have the great advantage and limitation of being able to speak without committing their government to action. Governments must be persuaded to take action, even if mild. The UN Secretary General must be persuaded to take steps in getting negotiations started. Governments must be pressured constantly to ask for negotiations.
I would like to suggest that His Holiness the Dalai Lama write individual letters to each parliamentarian requesting his or her assistance. Parliamentarians get too much mail, but a personal letter written by someone of the eminence of the Dalai Lama would be powerful. Such a personal appeal may move those not already involved in this struggle. Also parliamentary debates and hearing should continue to be held as often as possible on Tibet.
Hon. Tashi Wangdi: I would like to draw your attention to a long report by Xinhua, it is worth looking at. It states that the Chinese government has always been open to negotiations, but that the Dalai Lama has been insincere, has internationalised the issue, speaks differently in different fora, and keeps shifting his position.
However, the Dalai Lama's position has been very consistent. Direct contact between the Tibetan leadership in exile and the Chinese leadership in Beijing started in 1979. At the invitation of the Chinese government, His Holiness the Dalai Lama sent his elder brother to Beijing in 1979. He met with Deng Xiaoping all senior leaders. Deng said that the Chinese leadership was prepared to discuss and resolve all issues concerning Tibet except for complete independence. Deng invited His Holiness to send fact-finding missions to on Tibet. Since that time His Holiness made earnest efforts to bring about meaningful negotiations based on the framework proposed by Deng. From 1979 to 1987, every effort was made to start earnest bilateral negotiations.
In 1982 and 1984 His Holiness sent high-level delegations to Beijing for exploratory talks. But each time, the Chinese leaders became increasingly intransigent. From the Tibetan side we faithfully kept our discussions with the Chinese government confidential. But from the Chinese side, each time, before our delegation had even reached back to India, the Chinese had already published articles on our discussions, many of which were negative.
Many people around the world offered to help but wanted to know what the Tibetan position was. Public opinion became confused. We in all good faith, did not want to make our position public. But as things worsened in Tibet, we had to make our position public. Thus in 1987, His Holiness the Dalai Lama issued his Five Point Peace Plan in Washington. In 1988 he elaborated the last point of his plan in Strasbourg, making it clear that he sought negotiations and did not insist on independence if genuine self-rule was guaranteed. He made it clear that he would have preferred to have bilateral discussion with the Chinese government, but since we received no response from them we had no choice but to appeal to the international community.
At this point it is clear that China will not move on this issue except upon international pressure. China needs to be persuaded that its own credibility is affected by not finding a peaceful resolution to this issue. There is the point of view that international pressure is counterproductive, the idea being that there needs to be a face-saving mechanism when dealing with China. But, in view, without international pressure there is no solution.
Judging from internal Chinese documents, international pressure does work. There are political changes taking place in China. Unless, at the moment of change, there is strong pressure to find a solution to the issue of Tibet, pressure to make the Chinese think their credibility is at state, there will be no benefit. If there is no pressure, then there is very little reason for the Chinese to feel they have to negotiate. That is why a multilateral strategy is so important.
Hon. Consiglio Di Nino: Is post-Deng China an opportunity to get China to talk or is that a dream on my part?
Hon. Ian Revell: Indications from our embassy in Beijing are that no major changes should be expected in the short term.
Hon. Bob Brown: I agree with the idea to get a mild motion through Parliament, but I want add an activist viewpoint. I don't want us to be too mild in our actions. A stranger approach might bring better results.
Parliamentarians tend to be too mild and not to take advantage of their privileged position to do what others cannot do. Parliamentarians should not attend meetings with Chinese officials without confronting them with the Tibetan issue. They should demand that Chinese officials take specific actions. During an address of Bill Clinton to the Australian Parliament, I interjected to ask him whether he would bring up the Tibet questions in his talks with the Chinese. Some of my colleagues saw this as offensive, but I maintained that torture in Tibet was much more offensive. The morality of trade with China must always be spoken to. International sanctions should be brought back into the discussion. Parliamentarians should work in very close cooperation with support groups at the grassroots level.
What specifically can we learn from South Africa? It is because of intense activism that Beijing lost its bid to host the Olympics in 2000. We could try to use such global events to highlight the Tibetan issue. Perhaps, there could be a parliamentary convention on Tibet in Sydney right before the Olympics, since after all the Tibetan voice was in part responsible for the decision to not hold the Olympics in 2000 in Beijing.
Hon. Ian Revell: I agree, but in reality we can't have such idealistic hopes. I think we should get the issue of negotiations on the table. I too asked about Tibet when I was in the Great Hall of the People. I agree with you that we have to keep confronting the Chinese by asking those questions.
Hon. George Fernandes: It would be difficult to talk today about a boycott or sanctions, but it is possible to have a movement to persuade people not to buy Chinese goods. One third of Chinese exports go the United States. Trade gives us strength to negotiate. Boycotts are helpful and where not possible people could burn Chinese products in protest, a move utilized by the Indian freedom movement.
